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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OF UTAH in the
interest of

STATE

KENNETH

EUGENE MARQUEZ

Case No. 14571

A person under eighteen
years of age.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF THE APPELLANT
WITHOUT REQUIRING ANY FOUNDATION THAT SUCH
PRINTS WERE TAKEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND JUVENILE COURT RULES.

II.

DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN DECLARING FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF THE
APPELLANT ADMISSABLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.
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III.

EVEN AFTER DECLARING THE ADMISSABILITY OF
FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE OF THE APPELLANT UNDER
THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY
RULE, DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR IN NOT REQUIRING SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION UNDER THE
EXCEPTION ITSELF.
DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR IN ADMITTING FINGER-

IV.

PRINT RECORDS OF THE APPELLANT WITHOUT REQUIRING SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION AS TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE RECORDS.

v.

DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the Second Distric:

Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated
April 12, 1976, committing Kenneth Eugene Marquez, a juvenil'
to the Utah State Industrial School.

Cammi trnent occurred

subsequent to an adjudicatory hearing conducted March 18, io•
at which appellant was found guilty of the offenses of burgl'
and theft.
. t e d on Nove::
T h e offenses charged were allegedly cornnnt

.
.
.
2 1 1975 , at a single-family
dwelling
in
the " Ave1·
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es

11

area

l'

e::

of Salt Lak° City.

According to the testimony of the investi-

c;;;tir.g polic~ offic",::- and the O\·mer of the home, access was
c;air.ed by ~ear.s cf a forced entry through a back door to the
nouse.

The house was entered and several items of personal

property were reported missing from the living area of the
house.

The only window to an unconnected cellar of the house

was reported by the cwner to have been found by him with the

glass

unbro~en

of the cellar.

and in its permanent frame lying on the floor
This finding was concurrent with discovery

of the burglary and theft of the upstairs portion of the house.
No property was discovered missing fron the cellar, nor was
e~try

to the upstairs portion of the house possible from inside

the cellar.
Two days later, on November 4, a latent fingerprint was
lifted from the cellar window by the Salt Lake City Police.
(State's Exhibit 2).

The police officer who lifted his print

testified that the window had been re? laced in the cellar wall,
contrary to previous police instructions to owner of the home.
No testimony was preser..ted in explanation of when or by whom

the cellar window was replaced.

One investigating officer had

!Jc"'-Vi:-usly testified that he advised the victim on November 2,
the day cf the burglary, not to move the window until the crime
lab technician was able to process it.
At trial, the only evidence introduced by the State against

~e appellant was testimony by Officer Bill D. Simpson, a technicion in the, Ide>ntification Division of the Salt Lake City Police
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Department.

Officer Sir.?50n testified that one

latent~

was taken by him on No'l9c".lber 4, 1974 from th<" outside Siirfa
of the window to the cellar which, again, had no inside c'~'.
tion

to the living portion of the home, that the latent p:

was then compared to a fir.gerprint card which reportedly ho'
been in the possession of the Salt Lake City Police Deparu;,,
since 1973, and that the card purportedly identified the p::
as belonging to the appellacit.

(State's Exhibit 1)

Mr. Sfr·

testified that the latent print from the window was coIT1para::
to one of the prints on file.

(State's Exhibit 3)

No furt:.

evidence of any kind was introduced by the State against tJ'
appellant.
Although timely objection by defense counsel was mac'
as to the lack of founca ti on showing compliance with statut,,:
provisions and juvenile court rules governing the

fingM~c

of juveniles and as to the conpetency of the fingerprint er::
its elf, such obj ec ti ens were overruled.

Defense counsel als

moved to dismiss the case based upon insufficient evidence t
support a determination that the appellant was guilty of bic::
or theft.

Counsel's Motion was denied.

Appellant was found guilty of burglary and theft ano
subsequently committed to the Utah State Industrial School.
INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION
Where a court is ccr.sidering a delinquency charge ou:
.
.
·le cour:
t o the special
procedures established by the Juven 1 ·

-4-
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and Rules which pointedly state that such proceedings are not
criminal in nature, there is grave danger of injustice in the
elimination of the usual safeguards surrounding a criminal trial.
43 MR 2d 1130.

In this vein, Dean Wigmore in his Treatise

on Evidence, Vol. 5.Jd ed § 1400, has said:
The procedure devised for juvenile courts
is apt and enlightened. Nevertheless,
the promoters of that legislation in their
enthusiasm for its benefits and their
determination to eliminate the conditions
of the usual criminal court, have gone to
the borderline of prudence in their
iconoclasm ....
During

th~

past decade the United States Supreme Court

has determined in three cases the boundaries of constitutional
rights afforded children who come within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court, and it is important that those be acknowledged
here at the outset.

Kent v. United States, 383 U S 541 (1966),

In Re Gault, 387 U S 1 (1967), In Re Winship, 397 U S 583

(1970).

Although these landmark cases are well known, the principles
of those decisions are set forth herein because of the collective
mandate they set forth for provision of due process protections
in delinquency proceedings parallel to those involved in adult
criminal proceedings.
In Kent v.

u.s.,

supra, the transfer of jurisdiction

from Juvenile Court to the adult court of a 16 year old boy
Was

held illegal.

The Court decried the long, procedurally

irregular history of the case and reasoned that denial to a
iuve>nile of procedural protections available to an adult could

-5-
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not be justified by any of the special protections allegedfy
provided by the juvenile system under the doctrine of "par'r·
patriae."

The court relied heavily on the transfer statut':

of the District of Columbia but clearly spoke in broad instr;_
terms of the right of the juvenile to procedural protections.
In Re Gault, supra, expanded and clarified the genera:
ruling of Kent, supra, and unequivocably held that wlthin th;
Juvenile Court system the essentials of due process and fair
treatment in delinquency proceedings require:

(1)

the givi"c

of adequate and timely notice of the charges against the juv':
(2) notice that the child is entitled to be represented by cc. 1
(3) that the privileges against self-incrimination afforded
by the Fifth Amendment apply in juvenile proceedings, and (41
that a child involved in an adversary proceeding has the rig'.:
to confront and cross examine witnesses as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.

The Gault holding has been the foundation

of juvenile delinquency proceedings since 1967.
The standard by which a juvenile may be deemed guilty
of a delinquency charge was determined in In Re Winship, ~
The standard established there was "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt",that required in adult criminal proceedings.

Here the

court refused to accept the argument that a juvenile proceedr
which could result in punishment through confinement in an i:,
·
·
tution
was not criminal and that due process protections

therefore unnecessary.

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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we~~

,,..

'

Th~

court rPasoned:
"Civil labels and good intentions do
not ther:tselves obviate the need for
criminal due process safeguards in
juvenile courts.
397 U S at 365.

With these specified constitutional guarantees identified,
the extension of applicable rules of evidence to juveniles in
adjudicatory settings as demanded by due process is clear.

With

the exception of the right to a jury trial enjoyed by adults,
the juvenile delinquency adjudication must, to be consistent with
the Supreme Court Opinions, be conducted just as an adult criminal
trial.
As stated in People v. Fitzger1ld, 244 N.Y. 307, 155
N.E. 584 (1927),

"A child who commits an act which would
be burglary or larceny in an adult, may
be tried in the children's court and convicted and sent away ... The Act, however,
must be proved; and it must be proved by
some kind of evidence
There must be a
trial; the charge against the child cannot be sustained upon mere hearsay or
surmise; the child must first have committed the act of burglary or of larceny
before it can be convicted of being a
delinquent child. The act remains the
same, and the proof of the act is equally
necessary whether we call it burglary,
larceny or delinquency. The name may
change the result; it cannot change the
facts.
Utah recognizes the applicability of evidentiary safeguards in juvenile proceedings.

As set forth in Rule 2 of the

Utah Rules of Evidence (effective July 1, 1971), the application

-7-
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of the rules in judicial proceedings is defined as folki·is:
Except to the extent to which they may
be relaxed by other procedural rule or
statute applicable to the specific situation, these rules shall apply in every
proceeding, both criminal and civil,
conducted by or under the supervision
of a court, in which evidence is produced.
The Utah Rules of Evidence are clearly those applicab:
to the case herein as there are no provisions in the Juvenil'
Court Act to limit or modify their application in delinquenc
adjudications.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE JUVE:HLE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDE:lCE FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF
THE ACCUSED WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION
THAT SUCH FINGERPRINTS WERE TAKEN IN
COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND JUVENILE COURT RULES.

Two sets of fingerprints identified as belonging tot.
appellant were introduced at trial.

The fingerprint card he:

by the Salt Lake City Police Department since 1973 was admit:
'
' ' l
over defense counsel's objection that there was 1nsuff1cieu

foundation laid by the state to determine if the prints tafi'
in 1973 were taken ar.d held by the police in compliance with
the Utah statute goverr.ing the taking of fingerprints of j~
(Transcript, P.20).

· erpr'
The record indicates that the f i~
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card used as a comparison with a latent print found on an outside
cellar window of the burglarized home provided the only basis
for a determination of identification and guilt of the appellant.
BecausP no foundation was laid by the State to assure
compliance with Section 55-10-116 and Rule 39, Utah Juvenile
court Rules of Practice and Procedure (hereafter U.J.C.R.P.P.),
admission of State's Exhibit No. 1 was reversible error.
Section 55-10-116 U.C.A.
of juveniles.

(1953) governs the fingerprinting

The statute provides:
... Without the consent of the (juvenile
court) Judge, no fingerprints shall be
taken of any child taken into custody
unless the case is transferred for criminal proceedings.

No transfer for criminal proceedings was initiated against
the appellant herein.

Therefore, in accordance with Section

55-10-116, the fingerprints taken in 1973 are inadmissible with-

out proper foundation that such prints were obtained legally
as the result of obtaining judicial consent.

If there is insuffi-

cient foundation to prove the legality of the taking of the
appellant's prints, such prints must be presumed to have been
illegally obtained and therefore are inadmissible as the fruits
of an illegal act by the police.
There is no recognized Utah case law on this question.
However, the United States Supreme Court has ruled on the admissability of fingerprint evidence.

In Davis v. Mississippi, 394

U 8 721 (1969), the Supreme Court ruled that all evidence obtained

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

illegally, including fingerprints, is inadmissible in a ster
court.

The opinion states:
Our decision recognizes no exception to
the rule that illegally seized evidence
is inadmissible at trial however relevant
the seized evidence may be as an item of
proof .... To make an exception for illegally seized evidence which js trustworthy
would fatally undermine [the sanction to
redress and deter overreaching conduct
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment].
The Utah Juvenile Court has promulgated administrativ

Rules relating to the means by which police agencies may ob:
consent of the juvenile court to take a juvenile's

fingM~~

Rule 39 UJCRPP embodies Section 55-10-116 U .C .A. (1953) and
was originally modified by general order No. 3, dated May 4,
1966, which specified those circumstances under which the cc
of a juvenile court judge is implied.

General order No. J s:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Judges of the
Utah State Juvenile Court that duly appointed
and acting law enforcement officers in the State
of Utah may take the fingerprints of any person
under the age of eighteen years, which such
officer has lawfully taken into custody:
1.

When such person has committed one of the
following acts:
(a)

Any offense which would be a felony
if committed by an adult.

(b)

Any offense that would be petit
larceny if committed by an adult.

(c)

Any offense of depriving a motor
vehicle owner of possession.

(d)

Any offense involving a sexual
exhibition.

(e)

Running away from home without
the consent of parents or guardian.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2.

In any other case when such person has
been lawfully taken into custody upon sufficient evidence tending to connect said
pPrsor, with the commission of an offense
that would be a crime if committed by an
adult, and fingerprints are reasonably
necessary for comparison with latent
prints obtained at the crime scene to
further establish that said person perpetrated the offense or that he is innocent
of the offense.

During the trial of the appellant the court refused to
make

a determination as to whether general order no. 3 applied

for foundation purposes to the fingerprints in question or whether
Rule 39 as amended in March 1975 was applicable.
The 1975 amendment reads:
RULE 39. Fingerprinting Persons under Eighteen
Years of Age.
A juvenile may not be fingerprinted without
the express permission of a Judge of the Juvenile
Court except that consent is hereby given in
accordance with this rule in the following cases:
1.

If the juvenile is 14 years or older and
is taken into custody and ref erred to the
Juvenile Court for allegedly committing
a criminal act which would be a felony if
committed by an adult. Said prints may
be filed by law enforcement agencies.
If
the Court does not find that the child
committed the alleged felony, the fingerprint card and all copies of the fingerprints shall be destroyed by the law
enforcement agency, or upon request of
the Juvenile Court, shall be delivered to
the Juvenile Court for the purpose of
destroying said prints.

2.

If latent fingerprints are found during
the investigation of a criminal offense
and the law enforcement officer has
reason to believe that they are those of
the juvenile in custody, he may fingerprint the juvenile regardless of age or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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11 -

offense for purpOSPS of immediate comparison with the latent fingerprints.
If the
comparison is negative the fing,Jrprint card
and otho.r copies of the fing(erprints takf'n
shall be immediately destroyed.
If the
comparison is positive and the juv<"nile
is under 14 years of age and ref erred to
the Court, the fingerprint card and other
copies of the fingerprints shall be delivered to the Court for disposition. If
the juvenile is not referred to Court, thf'
prints shall be immediately destroyed by
the law enforcement agency, or upon request cf the Juvenile Court, delivered to
the Juvenile Court for the purpose of
destroying the prints.
3.

If the Juvenile Court finds that a
juvenile 14 or more years of age has
committed a felony, the prints may be
retained in the local police file
and copies sent to the State Bureau
of Criminal Identification, provided
that said bureau and local police
agency shall insure that no copies of
said fingerprints shall be delivered
or sent to any other agency or individual without the express permission
of the Juvenile Court and shall maintain said prints in a separate juvenile
file.
However, law enforcement officers
and staff of the bureau may have access
to the fingerprints for comparison purposes.

4.

Under no circumstance shall copies of
the fingerprints be sent to the Federal
Bureau of Identification without the
express permission of the Juvenile Court.

In those instances where the juvenile in
custody does not fall within the above exceptions
and the law enforcement officer deems it advisable to have the juvenile fingerprinted, application for such consent sh~ll be made by the
officer or official who propo-~s to take the
fingerprints with the reasons set forth.

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The safeguards and procedures set out in these rules,
whichever is applicable, are very clear and specific, as they
should be.

The Juvenile Court in promulgating these rules was

pressing the limits of perrnissable delegation of legislatively
mandated responsibilities by providing a mechanism that allows
police officers to fingerprint juveniles without obtaining the
specific consent of the Juvenile Court Judge.

The dangers that

this delegation may be abused if not closely scrutinized and
jealously monitored by the Juvenile Court is obvious.

The only

means available is that requested by defense counsel here - a
foundation laid by the State showing that the rules had been
complied with in the taking and keeping of appellant's fingerprints.
The issue here is thus not which set of rules is applicable.

Rather, the legality of the taking of the prints through

foundation evidence must be shown under either rule, since the
same purpose is effected by both.

Further, Rule 21 U.J.C.R.P.P.

(1974) requires that only evidence that is "competent •.. shall
be admitted."

To be admissible as competent evidence, the state

must sustain the burden of showing, through adequate foundation,
that the comparison prints were obtained in compliance with
Section 55-10-116 and Rule 39 U.J.C.R.P.P.
It is clear from the trial transcript that absolutely
no foundation showing compliance- with the forgoing statute or

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rules was laid by the State or required by the Juvf,nil" Ccu:
(Transcript beginning at Page 20).

The Court thus admittrd

the comparative fingerprint card into evic1°nce without assu:
that the protections embodied within the statute and
afforded the appellant.

rul~s

The admission of the prints int 0

:.
;

was reversible error and a denial of Due Process of Law as c.
anteed by Article I, Sec. 7 of the Constitution of Utah.
II.

THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN DECLARING FINGERPRINT RECORDS
ADMISSABLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.

The state was allowed, over counsel's objection, toa.
the comparative fingerprints purportedly of appellant under:
Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule.
Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule 63(1J:

The substance of this rule and exc;:

is:
Evidence of a statement which is made
other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove
the truth of the matter stated is
hearsay evidence and is inadmissible
except:
(13) Writings offered as memoranda
or records of acts, conditions or
events to prove the facts stated
therein, if the Judge finds that
they were made in the regular course
of a business at or about the time
of the act, condition or event recorded, and that the sources of information from which made and the
method and circumstances of their
preparation were such as to indicate
their trustworthiness.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is app llant's contention that the admission of finger0

r~int

records undPr the Business Records Exception was reversible

error.
In the case of Pecole v. Zerbes, 6 Cal. 2d 425, 57 P.2d
1319 (1936), the California Supreme Court ruled that where the
state's fingerprint expert had not knovm the person fingerprinted
personally and had not personally recorded the prints on the
fingerprint card, his testimony was correctly excluded by the
trial court as hearsay and the fingerprint card was properly
rendered incompetent.

The foundational requirements set forth

by the court clearly exceed those requirements under the Business

Records Exception, supra.

Appellant respectfully submits that

the Zerbes rule, applicable to the facts in this case, is sound
judicial precedent which should be recognized and adopted by
this court.
III.

EVEN ASSUMING FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE
IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS
RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY
RULE, THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING FINGERPRINT RECORDS
BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION
UNDER THAT EXCEPTION.

If it was net error to admit the fingerprint card into
evidence as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 63 (13) still
requires that the presiding judge base the decision to admit
0

"

th"

"trustworthiness" of the evidence offered.

This trust-
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worthiness must be demonstrated to the court.
Fingerprint evidence is certainly no more trusli·iorth.
~

than other types of evidence such as weapons or narcotics.

fact that matter offered into evidence in support of the ct
or defense of a party is logically relevant to the issues~
does not mean i t is admissible.

What may be relevant may b'

rendered incompetent and inadmissible as to the rules of e·i,_
20 ALR 246.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Davie, 121

U~hli

240 P. 2d 265 (1952) ruled that regular entries made in the c.
of business are admissible in evidence only when proper foe:.: .
is laid in order to insure proof of the trustworthiness of:
records submitted.

The recognized Utah foundational standa'..

is that set forth in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
96 Utah 331, 85 P. 2d 819

(1938).

This case allowed the i:.:

duction of business entries "made in the usual course of

b~:

1

introduced from proper custody, and upon a showing of genero
authentication."

Clayton also requires the offering party:
0

show the necessity of admitting records without requirir.9'

Ci

person making the entry to testify, the custody from whic~ ·
records were taken, and that the records were prepar~ ~t
due course of the business' work.

Foundation testimony of'.c

by the state in the instant case does not meet even the stc''
required by State v. Davie, supra, and

~layton

v.

Life Ins. Co., supra.

th

21
as

M~

tra
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Therefore, the court failed even to require a sufficient
foundation to assure that the comparative prints were, in fact,
taken and maintained by the police as a "business record" as
contemplated by the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The admission of

the prints was reversible error.

TV.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION
LAID TO INSURE THE AUTHENTICITY
OF THE FINGERPRINT CARD ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE.

Fingerprint evidence when competent, relevant and material
and when presented by qualified experts, is admissible for the
purpose of establishing the identity of an individual.

People v.

Van Cleave, 208 Cal. 295, 280 Pac. 983 (1929), Commonwealth v.
Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503, 13 N.E. ld 382 (1939) Cert. denied
304 U.S.

562

(1939), State v. Kuhl, 42 Nev. 185, 175 Pac. 196

(1918), Commonwealth v. Loomis,

270 Pa. 254, 113 Atl. 428 (1921) .

Yet, to be competent the fingerprint evidence must be admitted
only after sufficient foundation is laid by the State to authenti-

cate the fingerprint evidence admitted.
The amount of authentication required should vary with
the purpose of the evidentiary matter offered.
210 Kan.

363, 502 P. 2d 718

(1972).

State v. Suing,

Where evidence is offered

as a general representation, very slight proof of reliability
may be sufficient, but where offered to prove individualized
traits, much more convincing proof of dependability is required.
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Fingerprint evidence is of the most delicate nature;
i t may be clearly developed, improved and intensified or

ju~

as easily destroyed, dependent upon the equipment used, and
the experience, interest, knowledge, skill and
the persons working with it. 1

versatili~ct

Therefore, convincing proof

of authentication is essential.
This theory is clearly supported by Professor Mccormic
in his treatise on Evidence.

2d Ed.,

§

212: Demonstrative Ev:·

dence, P. 524 wherein he states that when evidence is of such
a nature as not to be readily identifiable or to be susceptit
to alteration by tampering or

;::ontamination, a substantially

more elaborate foundation for admissibility should be requin:
Such foundation should track the chain of evidence with: "suE
cient completeness to render i t improbable that the original
i tern has either been exchanged with another or been contamina:
or tampered with." Id at P.254.
Clearly analogous to the instant case are the fou~~~
and authentication standards required for the admission of ni
co tics, based upon the destructible nature of the evidence it:
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Madsen,

28 Utah 2d 108, 41 '

P. 2d 670 (1972), ruled in a prosecution for the sale of amphe>

1 Walter Scott, ~ingerprint Mechanics,
Charles c. Thomas, (1951)

-18-
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that the circumstances surrounding the preservation and custody
of

th<~

physical objects or substances connected with the commi-

ssion 0f the alleged crime and the liklihood of tampering are
factors to be considered in determining adrnissability.

Further

cases supporting the proposition that a continuous chain of
custody is necessary for adrnissability of a controlled substance
include Jackson v. State, 552 P.2d 1356, cert. denied 95 S.Ct.
637 (1974), Ryder v. State,

513 P.2d 593 (1973), and People v.

Atencio, 529 P.2d 636 (1974).
Actual authentication is essential in this case since
almost three years had passed since the taking, processing and
classifying of the fingerprint card offered as primary evidence
of appellant's guilt.

Also, by Mr. Simpson's own testimony,

he had no first-hand knowledge of the actual taking of prints
placed on the card and his initial experience with the prints
in question occurred when he classified them.

Further, there

is testimony that the envelope containing the fingerprint card
had never been sealed.

Without proper authentication as to

the competency of the evidence as required under Rule 21 it
is open to question whether the prints admitted into evidence
were those of the appellant, or whether the chain of custody
may have been broken during the three year period between the
initial taking of the disputed prints in 1973 and the time of
trial in 1976.
It is again clear from the record that the foundation

~id by thP State did not prove a chain of custody sufficient
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to assure the authenticity or reliability of the prints.

Tr

admission of the prints by the Juvenile Court Judge constitt
reversible error.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
THE DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.

In order to overcome a Motion to Dismiss, the State
have introduced evidence which, standing alone, is

me

sufficie~:

to prove appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
supra.

In this case, the state's evidence only showed that:

burglary and theft occurred.

There was presented no substar.t

evidence that the appellant was the perpetrator of the burgk
or theft of the upstairs living portion of the victim's home,
The question of whether or not the prosecution has sa:
f ied its burden of proof can be analyzed in terms of an evici'
tiary principle forwarded by Wigmore.
"(The proposition) cannot be, 'Is there
evidence?'.
. Rather the proposition
seems to be this: Are there facts in
evidence which, if unanswered, would
justify men of ordinary reason and fairness in aff i:cming the question which the
plaintiff is bound to maintain?'"
9 Wigmore 3d Ed. Section 2494.
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This principle has been recognized in Seybold v. Union Pac. Ry. co.,
121 Utah 6, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951); Continental Bank and Trust co.

v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 892 and State v. Garcia,
11 Utah 2d 167, 355 P. 2d 57

(1960).

In State v. Garcia, supra, the court affirmed a conviction
of first degree murder but in its opinion delineated that standard
by which substantial evidence as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt should be judged.

The opinion stated:

It is universally recognized that
there is no .
. question (for the
trier of fact) without substantial
evidence indicating defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. This requires evidence from which the .
(trier of fact) could reasonably
find the defendant guilty of all
material issues of fact beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id at 59.
The only evidence presented against the appellant is
circumstantial as well as insubstantial in nature.

Only one

latent fingerprint identified as belonging to the appellant
was taken in the area of the crime scene.
two days after the burglary.

The print was taken

It was found on the outside surface

of the window to a cellar disconnected from the area of the
house which was burglarized and from which personal property
was taken.

The window had been tampered with during the two

day period, contrary to police instructions.

The print was

then matched and found comparable to an unauthenticated fingerprint card identified as containing prints purportedly of the
appellant.

-21-
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The appellant contends that no trier of fact could Pa:
ably and fairly have found the appellant guilty of burglary
or theft beyond a reasonable doubt given the insubstantial _
dence presented by the state.
CONCLUSION
Based on the facts,

law and reasoning set forth hereir.,

the decision of the Second District Juvenile Court for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah should be reversed and Mr. Marque:
should be granted an immediate release from the Utah State
Ir.dustrial School.
Respectfully submitted,

~~Yfl1a~
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rnez for Appellant
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